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Abstract 
This study combines data analysis with multilevel processing of visual communication to 
classify the visual frames of state-sponsored social media propaganda. We relied on Twitter’s 
Election Integrity data to sample five propaganda targets of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), 
including Russian and American partisan groups, and explored how their operations deviated 
from canonical state propaganda marked by symbols of national identity and heroic masculinity. 
The results show that the visual frames employed by the IRA are designed to embody the vox 
populi with relatable, familiar, or attractive faces of ordinary people. The results also indicate 
that IRA influence operations displayed cultural acuity and familiarity with the social identity of 
their targets, and that the visual narrative the agency crafted trafficked primarily in the tropes of 
regular guys or attractive young women. We discuss these findings and argue that state-
sponsored propaganda has attuned to subcultural and visual affordances of social platforms. 
 
Keywords 




Influence operations on social platforms have employed explicit textual and visual narratives that 
deviate from the grammar of state propaganda. Canonical war propaganda, purposefully tailored 
to boost morale and provide up-to-date information on the war effort, was tailored to traffic in 
the symbology of national identity, military prowess, and heroic masculinity—overt tropes 
embodied in proud wives waving well-equipped soldiers off to an honorable war. The balancing 
act of war propaganda typically entailed psychological tricks to boost morale while seeking to 
appear as truthful as possible (Welch, 2016). War visuals would go hand in hand with the war 
rhetoric, including the strategic objective of capturing territory and defeating the enemy on the 
ground. The absence of direct military action that marked the Cold War period gave way to 
propaganda efforts dedicated to sowing distrust, as exemplified by the KGB’s disinformation 
campaign framing HIV as an American biological weapon (Selvage, 2019). 
Pomerantsev (2019) argued that propaganda has always accompanied war, usually as a 
handmaiden to attrition warfare. But the mediatization of traditional institutions (Strömbäck, 
2008), of late by social media platforms, has effectively flipped the equation. Information 
warfare takes central stage and military operations, when unavoidable, follow large-scale 
influence operations embracing a range of measures performed by state or non-state actors aimed 
at influencing public opinion (Arif et al., 2018). This inversion requires a fundamentally different 
strategy, as influence operations are kept relatively separate from overt belligerent efforts. The 
target of propaganda efforts is no longer restricted to geography nor populated by military 
personnel (Steel, 2015), occupying instead communication networks now populated by 
Twitterbots, false accounts, sockpuppets, trolls, and paid influencers (Benkler et al., 2018; Bastos 
and Mercea, 2019). 
In this article, we consider whether tropes of heroic resistance or military endurance, 
typical of canonical state propaganda, track in a context of information but not attrition warfare. 
Visual propaganda research has found that emotional and human-interest frames tend to garner 
the largest amount of interest on social media (Seo, 2019). To this end, we probe whether social 
media propaganda seeks to embody the vox populi by employing relatable, familiar, or 
alternatively attractive faces of ordinary people―that which in the US context is referred to as 
“the man on the street” (MOTS). We refer to such familiar or attractive faces as ‘the guy next 
door’ and the ‘implausibly attractive young woman.’ The former is embodied by an unassuming 
yet average male lacking overt tropes of hegemonic masculinity like strength and dominance 
commonly embraced by Russian propaganda (Romanets, 2017), while the latter is characterized 
by tangible exploitation of the female body for maximum erotic impact and objectification 
(Davis, 2018). 
In the following, we analyze the visual frames in profile images of Twitter accounts 
operated by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a company specialized in online influence 
operations based in St. Petersburg, Russia. With profile pictures lending credibility to user’s 
communications (Morris et al., 2012), as well as seizing attention, eliciting emotions (Rose, 
2016), and galvanizing engagement (Seo, 2014), we posit that IRA seized the currency of profile 
images to attain social embeddedness. Its curated impersonation points to a strategic shift from 
the visual representation of the enemy through stereotypical images in war propaganda (Welch, 
2013) to self-presentation as ordinary citizens. 
 
Previous Work 
Framing (Entman, 1993) and strategic narrative studies (Miskimmon et al., 2014) have 
established that the way the press depicts issues otherwise removed from citizens’ own 
experience has a powerful effect on how reality is perceived. In the absence of contradicting 
personal experience, individuals are likely to rely on media framings resulting from complex 
interactions between journalistic norms and economic considerations, with far-reaching social 
and cultural implications (De Vreese, 2005). By adapting framing contestation to our current 
information ecosystem, this framework has in some measure offered a testable alternative to the 
established, but arguably more limited, framework of propaganda studies that traditionally 
uncovered systemic biases entrenched in modern mass media (Herman and Chomsky, 2010). The 
contemporary disinformation ecosystem can thus be explored more granularly by repurposing 
the framing framework to account for instances of digital network framing.  
A seminal suggestion to this effect has been offered by Entman and Usher (2018), who 
sought to revisit the cascade network model of frame activation against the backdrop of a mature 
social media ecosystem. Influence operations could thus be traced through strategies of 
persuasion and impression management, typically explored in framing studies and strategic 
narratives. This conceptual framework defines narratives as dynamic entities circulating in 
digital network frames that connect to structural grievances. The centralized topology of 
mainstream media is attached to decentralized social platforms, which may subtly and elusively 
alter the original frame. Frames employed by the press may thus undergo subtle reframing with 
accounts that source information to users subsequently redistributing this information to their 
followers. The resulting topology is that of a multistep flow of information diffusion (Hilbert et 
al., 2016), which starts with mainstream media reporting and may return to the press after 
bouncing around different groups of social media users that can skew the frame towards 
polarization. 
This repositioning of media institutions in public communication was advanced by 
multiple related developments, including the growing multiplication of the sources circulating 
symbols of social life, mass participation in the creation of online content (Chadwick, 2013), and 
the rise of citizen journalism as an alternative to dominant news organizations (Papacharissi, 
2015). In the context of the 2011 popular uprisings of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Papacharissi 
(2015) characterizes such reporting as attempts to communicate an accurate and authentic 
version of events in response to the censorship and manipulation perpetuated by that country’s 
then authoritarian regime. Such digital storytelling enabled the bottom-up rise of crowd-sourced 
elites elevated by networked publics to a position of prominence. 
One notable logic underpinning recent approaches to influencing public perceptions 
consists of painting reality in frames familiar to selected groups on social media (Del Vicario et 
al., 2016; Ferrara, 2017; Chadwick et al., 2018; Siegel and Tucker, 2018). By means of carefully 
edited visual content, the so-called Islamic State terrorist organization sought to both polarize 
and to attract young supporters to its theocracy by giving prominence to its extreme violence 
while promising thrills and individual stardom to new recruits (Andersen and Sandberg, 2018; 
Siegel and Tucker, 2018). Conversely, in the course of the 2016 US elections, the Russian 
Internet Research Agency attempted to accentuate socio-political cleavages among citizens and 
voters through hyperpartisan messaging (Bastos and Farkas, 2019), so as to similarly polarize but 
also disengage voters from the electoral process. Among the many techniques they employed—
discussed below and in greater detail elsewhere (Mueller, 2019)—a key visual prop it utilized 
consisted of misappropriating profile pictures (Benkler et al., 2018). 
IRA activity drew scholarly attention particularly to its expertly pitched right-wing 
framings and beliefs in the course of the 2016 US elections (Benkler et al., 2018). The framing 
cultivated by the agency, a clear departure from mainstream propaganda, is best unpacked 
against the backdrop of countercultural theory. Historically, normative interpretations of 
countercultures foregrounded their digression from a reference-category embodied by 
mainstream culture. However, alternative interpretations posit that subcultures exhibit a style, a 
key to unlocking their meaning (Gelder, 2005). Illustratively, Andersen and Sandberg (2018) 
highlight that cultural artefacts at the heart of violent Jihadist propaganda are designed to seduce 
its audience. In their words, “the so-called ‘jihadi cool’ creates a seductive subculture, attracting 
young people to participate in global Islamist terrorism because it is considered cool and 
exciting” (Andersen and Sandberg, 2018: 13). Similarly, the IRA sought to cultivate a larger 
range of distinct sections of the US public, extending from left-wing, to Black, LGBT, or right-
wing, anti-immigration and nationalist activists (Freelon et al., 2020). In this article, we explore 
the use of profile pictures as resonant cultural artefacts harnessed by the IRA to achieve such 
segmentation. 
 
Research aim and questions 
The Twitter profiles operated by the Internet Research Agency combined human-operated and 
automated accounts to perform as de facto crowd-sourced elites that occupied central positions in 
retweet networks throughout 2016 (Badawy et al., 2019). IRA operatives engaged in trolling by 
intervening in an online conversation to spark a reaction amongst readers at the behest and for 
the benefit of their patron. Leveraging black, white, and gray propaganda, IRA activity likewise 
testified to the aim to amplify a resonant discourse among targeted subcultures through the 
impersonation of its membership, including Black Lives Matter activists (Stewart et al., 2017; 
Freelon et al., 2020; Bastos and Farkas, 2019). In contrast to traditional public influence 
propaganda, marked by mass produced, mass distributed campaigns, the IRA activity was 
remarkable in its ability to identify and appropriate the subculture or social identity of relatively 
narrowly defined targets (Linvill and Warren, 2020; Kim et al., 2018; Jensen, 2018).  
Previous single-case research on the IRA intervention in the Black Lives Matter 
movement (Arif et al., 2018) pointed to a concerted attempt to inject content on both sides of 
framing contests enveloping the movement. A framing contest ensues as action-oriented 
interpretations constructed by individuals or groups to mobilize support for and/or demobilize 
opposition to their efforts are met by neutralizing forces engaging in counter-framing (Benford 
and Snow, 2000). In the case of #BlackLivesMatter, framing contests on Twitter pitted activist 
interpretations of protest as a response to the structural injustice perpetuated by law enforcement 
and government actions victimizing African Americans against, on the other hand, the counter-
framing of the movement’s protests as a usurpation of the rule of law attested, for instance, by 
the shooting of police officers (Stewart et al., 2017). The IRA accounts profiled in the analysis of 
the #BlackLivesMatter framing contest by Arif et al. (2018) exploited this divide using profile 
information and the retweet functionality to exhibit associations with either side of the contest. 
IRA profiles were analyzed as impersonations of imagined audiences (Arif et al., 2018), 
which on Twitter are an amalgamation of direct connections with one’s followers and indirect 
links with the larger Twitter social graph (Marwick and Boyd, 2011) through, for example, @-
mentions or retweets. The personas taken on by those profiles were strategic constructions 
tailored to their partisan clusters, ultimately able to portray an interesting and authentic self (Arif 
et al., 2018). They enlisted their profile information and pictures in the service of that apparent 
goal, self-describing themselves as either African American or, conversely, white male or 
female. They displayed cultural acuity alongside a sensitivity to the social identity of either side 
as supporters or detractors of the #BlackLivesMatter movement on Twitter. They were thus able 
to demonstrate an appreciation of the values, symbols, and views attached to their respective 
group membership (McGarty et al., 2014; Tajfel, 1978). This was achieved through the 
embracement of relevant subcultural styles articulated linguistically as well as visually through a 
partisan-political alignment and news consumption. The careful social curation driving these 
accounts prevented them from crossing the divide, instead embedding themselves firmly on their 
side of the fault-line (Arif et al., 2018). 
This meticulous curation projected the personification of ordinary citizens at the level of 
individual accounts. An earlier study of one of the most prominent IRA Twitter accounts (Xia et 
al., 2019) proposed that it engaged strategically in self-presentation, thereby resorting to social 
interaction as a stage where one performs an impression of oneself that resonates with an 
imagined audience (Goffman, 1959). Concentrating on its self-presentation, the authors were 
able to undertake an in-depth scrutiny of the language used by Jenna Abrams—the moniker 
adopted by the IRA account—specifically to embody an ordinary albeit opinionated Twitter user. 
Their interest was thus in how Jenna Abrams constructed an authentic and culturally resonant 
persona. Yet, while that examination was able to tease out the language used in the performance 
of Abram’s persona of an ordinary yet passionate American girl (Xia et al., 2019), it did not 
probe the visual elements of her self-presentation. 
Visual framing research, on the other hand, is largely focused on how the press curates 
and selects photos to cover international conflicts or electoral politics. Parry (2010) contrasted 
how two British newspapers framed the war using press photographs to represent the Israel-
Lebanon conflict. Brantner et al. (2011) investigated the effects of visual framing on the 
emotional response to different versions of news stories covering the Gaza conflict in 2009. A 
larger body of scholarship has expanded framing theory and second-level agenda setting by 
inspecting the visual presentation of presidential candidates in electoral campaigns, including 
markers of nonverbal behavior (Coleman and Banning, 2006; Grabe and Bucy, 2009). Beyond 
the studies reviewed hitherto, literature exploring the visual framing of propaganda campaigns 
and influence operations, particularly within an information ecosystem marked by digital and 
networking technologies, is still forthcoming. 
In the following, we take up this task and explore the visual tropes found in IRA Twitter 
accounts by employing open, manual coding of the visual content (Rose, 2016) and statistical 
analysis of aggregate compositional, chromatic, as well as emotional or social patterns (Fyfe and 
Ge, 2018). Building on the above studies, we hypothesize that the IRA profiles embodied real 
and ordinary citizens (Arif et al., 2018), displaying cultural acuity and a sensitivity to the social 
identity of their targets, not only in language use (Miller, 2019), but also in their visual self-
presentation with profile images (Xia et al., 2019). As such, we seek to scale up the initial 
assessment of cognate studies by way of a systematic examination of profile images deployed by 
the Internet Research Agency across multiple fault-line issues it targeted in its operations.  
 
Data and Methods 
We leverage the data set released by Twitter’s Elections Integrity initiative that reportedly 
identified and ultimately removed the universe of false accounts, Twitterbots, and sockpuppets 
operated by the Internet Research Agency (Elections Integrity, 2018). The first release of the 
data included 2752 accounts the company recognized were operated by the IRA (United States 
Senate Committee, 2017). This list was expanded in early 2018 to include 3814 IRA-linked 
accounts (Twitter, 2018). The data set was updated again to include 3836 Twitter accounts, along 
with the totality of images, videos, and profile images used or created by these accounts. 
Although some accounts were created as far back as 2009, most were created in 2013 (29%) and 
2014 (40%), with a smaller share of accounts created in 2015 (12%) and 2017 (12%). These 
accounts amassed a combined following of over six million users (N=6,386,749). This is the 
canonical IRA data set we analyze in this study. 
Informed by previous research that identified IRA propaganda targets (Bastos and Farkas, 
2019; Farkas and Bastos, 2018), we applied regular expression to profile descriptions and 
sampled five distinct groups: Muscovites, Black Lives Matter activists, Conservatives, Trump 
supporters, and Christians. We identified Russian accounts distributing domestic, white 
propaganda by querying the database for users that self-reported “Москва” as their location 
(n=206). Next, we identified black propaganda accounts targeting Conservatives, Trump, 
Christian, and Black Lives Matter supporters. We proceeded by sampling profiles with the 
keyword “Conservative” in the profile description (n=121) and repeated the process (avoiding 
selecting users more than once) for the keywords “Trump” (n=134), “God,” “Christ,” or “Jesus” 
(n=154), and finally “Black” or “BLM” (n=79). After removing false positives and 
disambiguating profiles with multiple matches, the sampled data returned 75 Black Lives Matter 
activists, 61 Christians, 104 Conservatives, 201 Muscovites, and 57 Trump supporter profiles. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the profiled groups. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
The multimodal information curated by IRA accounts was unpacked by image-captioning the 
Twitter profile images (Martinec and Salway, 2005), so that their visual content was translated to 
text for downstream analysis (see Supplementary Information). We did not find any profile with 
no image or “Twitter eggs” (the default image for profile picture), but we identified stock photos 
of American actress Kaley Cuoco (Figure 1: first row, third column; third row, fourth column) 
and pop star Ariana Grande (Figure 1: fourth row, fifth column). A visual inspection of the 
profile images, vis-à-vis the demographic group they targeted, shows that the semantic 
relationship in IRA multimodal content is of complementarity as opposed to illustration, when 
the image supports the text, or anchorage, when the text supports the image (stat = 0). Instead of 
anchoring the textual information, the profile images are conceivably subordinated to the profile 
description and the content posted by these accounts. Yet, the overwhelming presence of young 
individuals (Figure 1) constitutes new information not readily available in the profile description 
and conceivably outside the scope of their political messaging. As such, the interplay between 
profile picture and profile description is one where both modalities contribute individually to the 
message, as each part contains details that the other does not (Otto et al., 2019). 
We collated the profile images of each of the five groups to pursue exploratory visual 
data analysis (Rogers, 2013; Fyfe and Ge, 2018). This pixel-level analysis can uncover patterns 
in visual media to produce a largescale representation and offer a broad-based “situational 
awareness” that is otherwise inaccessible (Manovich, 2009). We organized the profile images 
according to brightness and the color saturation of each image through an ImageMeasure2 plug-
in for ImageJ (Rasband, 2012). Two members of the team, with expertise in professional 
photography, subsequently coded each of the images to identify features in the composition, 
framing, and photographic techniques employed to produce the profile image. The coding 
procedure was informed by Rose (2016) and included the categories “number of people in the 
photo,” “race,” “gender,” “emotion,” “clothing,” and “background scenario” (see Supplementary 
Information: Coding Variables). These observations allowed us to generate the following 
categories accounting for the social identity of the portrayed individuals: gender (male, female, 
or group), race (Black, White, Asian, or other), and emotion (happy, friendly, tense, sad, or 
angry). It also allowed us to generate the following technical categories identifying the framing 
of individuals: composition (close-up, medium shot, three-quarter shot, or long shot), scenario 
(indoor vs. outdoor), and camera angle (high, neutral, or low angle). These technical categories 
drawn from visual framing studies and allow for probing whether the profile composition seeks 
to depict regular individuals instead of canonical tropes of state propaganda, where low angles 
and three-quarter shots are traditionally employed to portray the subject in a position of symbolic 
power over the viewer (Mandell and Shaw, 1973). 
In addition to explicit categories, our inductive coding rendered a key category devised to 
identify whether the profile photo explored sensual undertones, a subtle feature and proxy for 
attractiveness present in many profiles featuring women or sexualizing the female body. 
Sensuality has been defined as the involvement of multisensory surfaces, curves, and textures 
that evoke femininity, corporeality, and eroticism (Pritchard and Morgan, 2011) in contrast to 
cognitive or affective associations (Cho et al., 2015; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982). We relied 
upon the inferential definition employed in product management literature, as well as research 
cautioning against a clear definition of sensuality (Hofmeester et al., 1996), to establish the 
binary category “sensual” inductively based on prominent features of the profile photos of the 
accounts. These categories provide latitude for probing whether the profile composition portrays 
regular individuals instead of propaganda tropes trafficking on symbols of power and heroism. 
The final key category devised during the coding process refers to the extent to which 
professional photographic techniques were employed to produce the image. Professional 
photographic work generates aesthetic elements that differ substantively from amateur 
photography, notwithstanding recent advances in smartphone cameras, particularly the expert use 
of hue, brightness, and light controls (Leaver et al., 2020). We refer to this category as Quality to 
distinguish between professional-looking photos from those that are discernibly produced by 
users themselves (though both may have been misappropriated by IRA operatives). We reviewed 
the coding procedures repeatedly until we found the devised categories to be exhaustive and 
exclusive. Intercoder reliability was calculated on a random subsample of 90 images, with 
Krippendorff’s alpha=1 for race, male, female, and number of persons; alpha=.926 for 
background scenario; alpha=.828 for camera angle and quality; alpha=.75 for sensual; and 
alpha=.716 for the category emotion. Table 1 offers an overview of the coded categories. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
We further inspected the images by relying on the bwimage R package (Biagolini-Jr and 
Macedo, 2019) to identify patterns in the groups of profile images. The package analyzes digital 
images as cells holding information about the intensity of color channels red, green, blue, and 
alpha (representing transparency). We transform the color intensity data to pure black & white 
data, rendered into a binary matrix with the threshold_color function set to 50%, which is the 
function controlling the averaged intensity of red, green, and blue. Computer-supported analysis 
of digital images are commonly employed in the field of ecology to estimate vertical vegetation 
complexity and canopy openness (Díaz and Lencinas, 2018). Given the aims of this study, we 
adapted functions for detecting vegetation complexity to establish metrics of profile image 
complexity against a white background (Zehm et al., 2003). This method allows for 
systematically extracting information from images and processing the images in user profile at 
scale. 
We expect the triangulation of these methods to partially overcome the limitation 
underpinning the visual content analysis, which allows for greater reflexivity and 
contextualization of the data, but whose renderings of visual representation are difficult to scale 
due to the polysemic nature of visual information (Bock et al., 2011). We therefore sought not 
only to code the images by looking and counting visual cues, but also to compile the contextual 
information with descriptors of the profile photos to account for the context in which the image 
was produced. Although challenging, the integration of qualitative and quantitative processing of 
visual content allows for a multilevel processing of visual communication (Margolis and 
Pauwels, 2011) that can leverage the generalizability characteristic of quantitative research with 
the vantage point inherent to visual research, namely greater reflexivity and higher 
contextualization of the data. 
 
Results 
We proceed by processing the images in a computer program and extracting metadata such as 
color, brightness, and saturation to order the images on a Cartesian plane. The visualizations 
confirmed patterns evidenced in the data, with Figure 2 showing the predominance of blonde and 
professionally shot photos featuring clusters of implausibly attractive young women in the target 
groups of Christians, Conservatives, and Trump supporters. Indeed, a visual inspection shows 
that sexual and sensual exploitation of the female body is largely restricted to Christians, 
Conservatives, and Trump supporters, particularly the latter (x=.23, .22, and .32, compared with 
x=.07, and .13 for Muscovites and Black Lives Matter activists). The Muscovite images are 
marked by low color saturation and low brightness, in one quadrant, and high color saturation 
when the profile picture features subjects outdoors. This group comprises compositions that 
speak to notions of virility, control, and natural life producing greater brightness latitude and 
color saturation. Individuals in the Muscovite group often exhibit dark hair and a black 
background, or dark clothes, thereby shifting most of the images to the lower-left quadrant. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
The use of indoor and outdoor images in association with the use of professionally produced 
instead of homemade photos offers additional insights. Profile images in the Moscow group are 
more likely to prioritize outdoor areas and often feature blue skies, while USA-targeted Twitter 
profiles are more likely to feature indoor areas with a clear background. Whereas Russian 
profiles often feature adventurous backgrounds populated by masculine individuals, USA-
targeted Twitter profiles are more likely to feature implausibly attractive young women shot 
against a soft, balanced lighting and featuring professional makeup and composition in the 
image. While the appearance of these women would be plausible when encountered at random, 
they are not so when uniformly grouped as Trump supporters, a section of the electorate whose 
demographics deviate from the compositional motifs consistently employed in IRA profiles. 
The chromatic variance displayed across groups, along with the topical emphasis on 
regular individuals, shows IRA’s inclination to pick average looking men but unordinary 
attractive young women. The former embody unassuming yet average individuals lacking overt 
features of masculine tropes like strength and dominance, the typical hegemonic masculinity 
embraced by Russian propaganda as a trope for the country’s self-assured resurgence under the 
Putin regime (Romanets, 2017). Conversely, the latter are characterized by a tangible 
exploitation of shapes and textures that evoke femininity and eroticism, so that women are 
displayed with their appearance coded for maximum erotic impact and objectification (Mulvey, 
1975; Davis, 2018). 
The profile images in the Russian cohort are marked by unambiguous symbols and 
aspects associated with virility and adventure, while rightwing Americans are targeted with a 
composite of average young men and sensually crafted images of young women typical of soft 
advertisement employed by the cosmetic industry (Xie and Zhang, 2013). The contrast within 
American targeted audiences is also revealing. The profile images selected for Conservatives, 
Trump supporters, and Christians present higher brightness compared with the images selected 
for the Black Lives Matter group, with the latter presenting a wider range of saturation and 
brightness. 
Figure 3a shows the Conservative group on a Cartesian plane, thereby highlighting how 
compositional elements relate within the set. The agglutination of the brightest images and the 
low color saturation in the lower-right quadrant of the visualization results from a large set of 
close-ups, especially of fair-haired women. The images are bright and suggest artificial 
illumination typical of professional photography in image capture or post-production editing. 
Figure 3b, in opposition, comprises mostly close-ups with substantively distinct coordinates, 
from the highest contrast to the background in the images. The photographic elements are not 
standardized, with higher dispersion and illumination, which results in many images with a 
greater spectrum of color saturation.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
The visualization of Trump supporters in Figure 4a is interesting because of the chromatic 
splintering, with profiles in the lower-right quadrant concentrating most profile images of blond 
women with soft lighting. The lower-left quadrant, on the other hand, shows dark haired women 
along a few outliers. Figure 4b shows the Christian subgroup, with profile images largely 
occupying two sections in the center of the plot. The cluster on the right includes profile images 
with lower contrast and low color saturation, while the left cluster displays profile images with 
greater brightness and darker elements, such as black hair or dark clothing. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
The visual analysis of the images is consistent with the aggregate results gained from our manual 
coding of the material, but the quantitative analysis of the coded material provides greater 
granularity to the assessment of the compositional tropes employed by the IRA. Firstly, the 
indoor vs. outdoor polarity is marked by a cleavage, with Black Lives Matter activists, Trump 
supporters, Christians and Conservatives appearing regularly indoors, while Muscovites appear 
habitually outdoors (x=.84, .84, .73, and .78, respectively, compared with x=.55). Male 
individuals are more likely to appear in the Black Lives Matter and Moscow groups, but females 
dominate the profile composition of Christians, Conservatives, and particularly Trump 
supporters (x=.55 and .52, respectively, compared with x=.30, .16, and .11). Neutral angles are 
predominant across groups, but there are also important differences. Black Lives Matter activists 
and Christians are depicted with high angles (.41 and .36, respectively). Low angles are more 
common among Muscovites and Trump supporters (.15 and .18, respectively, against an average 
of .6 for the other groups). 
Emotions are surprisingly balanced across groups, with expressions of happiness and 
tenderness being prevalent, but there are also noticeable differences. Black Lives Matter activists 
are more likely to appear tense (x=.41 compared with x̃=.12). Christians, Muscovites, and Trump 
supporters are mostly tender (x̃=.42), while Conservatives are overwhelmingly happy (x=.55). 
Racial diversity is minimal, with whiteness prevailing across Christians, Muscovites, and Trump 
supporters and Black Lives Matter activists being largely black (x̃=.90 for both sets of groups). 
Selfies and self-portraits prevail in the profiles of Black Lives Matter activists and Conservatives 
(x̃=.66), while Christians and Trump supporters are mostly framed with regular close-ups 
(x̃=.85). While these groups resorted mostly to close-ups, which account for ¾ of the profile 
photos, Muscovites are mostly framed in close to medium angles typical of a three-quarter shot 
(x̃=.95). 
The compositional undertones employed across groups also offers interesting contrasts. 
Amateur profile photos are predominant across the groups, except for Trump supporters and 
Christian profiles. For Trump supporters, there is a strong divide between professional and non-
professional profile photos. Nearly one third of Christians also employed professional photos in 
their profiles. These differences are compounded by the number of individuals featured in the 
profile photo: Trump supporters, Muscovites, and Black Lives Matter activists are groups that 
consistently show a single headshot. The profile of Trump supporters is particularly prone to 
featuring implausibly attractive young women, likely photographed by professionals, while 
Muscovites and Black Lives Matter activists present a greater ratio of regular individuals. 
Christians and Conservatives average 1.15 people per profile, compared with .99 for Muscovites, 
as photos featuring groups of people are extensive in the first cohort. 
This is consistent with the word frequency extracted from the manual description of the 
images. Muscovites and Conservatives are more likely to feature men, while Trump supporters 
and Christians favor women (again speaking to the gender unevenness in profile compositions). 
White, young, and girl are the three central terms used to describe the profile of Conservatives, 
compared with man and attire for Black Lives Matter activists and man and smile for 
Muscovites. Conversely, Trump supporters and Christians were largely coded with the 
descriptors woman, smile, and endearing. In short, the word frequency extracted from the 
description summarizes Trump supporters and Christian profiles as “beautiful woman smiling,” 
while Black Lives Matter profiles are broadly described as “man wearing” and the descriptor of a 
specific attire (see Supplementary Information: Categories Summary). 
We triangulated the visual inspection of the data with a quantitative processing of the 
images using the bwimage R package (Biagolini-Jr and Macedo, 2019). This approach allowed 
us to identify the extent to which the average distribution of colors in each of the five groups is 
less than or equal to the threshold. We applied the function denseness_total to obtain information 
on color density, a logical test to calculate the threshold below which 75% of the canvas occurs. 
The automated image processing is consistent with the results of our qualitative coding of the 
images, as the average variation found in Trump supporters and Christians are similar (x̃=.6241 
and x̃=.6014) and at odds with those found in the Black Lives Matter activists (x̃=.5652), 
Conservatives (x̃=.4815), and Muscovite groups (x̃=.5276). These differences remain even at the 
threshold level of 80%, with Trump supporters and Christians again showing similar scores 
(x̃=.9229 and x̃=.9132) compared with Black Lives Matter activists (x̃=.9011), Conservatives 
(x̃=.8648), and Muscovite groups (x̃=.8729). 
Finally, we have considered the ethical dilemmas in displaying profile pictures that might 
have been taken from real people, as the IRA may have conceivably misappropriated profile 
images of real users, against the also possible scenario that these images may have been taken 
from stock photos of celebrities and models. In the end, our concerns were offset by the 
realization that the images explored in this study have been recontextualized to such an extent 
that they are detached from potentially existing personas, reflecting instead the profiles 




The results presented in this study highlight common visual tropes employed by state-sponsored 
propaganda that deviate from the canonical tropes of war propaganda, revolving around ideas of 
heroism, adventure, and resistance. The IRA propaganda campaign represents a point of 
departure by resorting instead to ordinary individuals but unordinary attractive young women, 
often portrayed with sophisticated makeup in professionally shot photos against a soft, balanced 
lighting. The chromatic and compositional variance identified in the profile photos shows that 
US conservative groups are targeted with a composite of average young men and sensually 
crafted images of young women typical of soft advertisements employed by the cosmetic 
industry. As such, the weaponization of the guy next door is counterintuitive given the lasting 
reliance of state propaganda on tropes of military prowess. 
The profile images in the Russians cohort, on the other hand, are marked by tropes of 
virility and domination. Emphasis is shifted from ordinary-looking male individuals to 
compositional undertones emphasizing power and adventure. Black Lives Matter activists are 
framed with another compositional frame altogether; depicted largely with high angles projecting 
tense expressions in a single headshot. These compositional choices do not merely depict gender 
inequalities and gendered stereotypes supporting traditional notions of femininity and 
masculinity. More than merely reflecting entrenched inequalities, the compositional tropes 
explored by the IRA appear to celebrate racial and gender discrimination. 
The results are also consistent with the notion that state-sponsored propaganda on social 
media exploits existing social tensions by framing contentious issues in a familiar but partisan 
light. IRA activity expertly pitched to right-wing framings and beliefs, but the agency also 
targeted distinct sections of the US electorate, including liberal subgroups, chief among which 
were Black Lives Matter activists (Freelon et al., 2020). Religious, racial, and cultural groups are 
targeted with disguised social media accounts exploring biases and prejudices, but also perceived 
markers of membership of these groups. While the profile pictures weaponized by the IRA may 
have been misappropriated from real-world users, there is nonetheless unordinary investment in 
editing, along with the careful curation sustaining the aggregated content. 
In contrast to mass produced, mass distributed traditional propaganda, IRA digital 
disinformation specifically targeted narrowly defined demographic, social, and political groups. 
Yet, the multitude of targeted social groups, and the broad ideological spectrum of their interests, 
suggest that the target of the propaganda efforts is not the social groups the campaign chooses to 
personify, be they Conservatives, Democrats, Black Lives Matter activists or Russian nationals. 
The target of this influence operation was social cohesion itself, which was either supported (as 
in the case of domestic Russian operations) or attacked by deepening social distrust with 
overheated rhetoric reminiscent of past campaigns of disinformation (Selvage, 2019). The 
emphasis and perhaps exaggeration placed on existing social divisions is leveraged to amplify 
threats and ultimately erode social trust and social cohesion. Within this line of thought, shared 
beliefs among the citizenry can be undermined if the population ceases to believe they are a part 
of a common community that encourages reciprocal trust. 
This may conceivably be achieved by infiltrating cultural subgroups and sowing distrust 
among targeted communities. The guy next door represents a considerable departure from 
archetypes of heroic masculinity; indeed, the guy next door is the embodiment of unassuming, 
dependable, yet average masculinity. He is not just ordinary, but also local, thus submitting a 
sense of familiarity that effortlessly evolves to notions of reliability and trustworthiness. The 
visual trope of the affable guy next door may conceivably ease the labor-intensive costs of 
infiltration. Similarly, the cohort of implausibly attractive young women may follow an 
analogous tactic of infiltration and subversion that exploits the male gaze and the depiction of 
women as sexual objects for the pleasure of the male viewer (Mulvey, 2006; Mulvey, 1975).  
However implausibly attractive as a group they may be, this visual trope is seemingly an 
optimal candidate for becoming embedded with Trump supporters. Ultimately, this analysis 
sheds new light on the visual aesthetics and grammar of self-presentation by IRA profiles (Xia et 
al., 2019) that linked individual performance to a social identity strategically catering to target 
subcultures, thereby marking a break with conventional state propaganda. Moreover, it highlights 
the salience of profile images as a key prop in social media propaganda that can be deployed by 
state actors to attain social embeddedness among target groups. Future research can continue to 
develop this line of enquiry through examinations of profile images by other types of actors, 
before and after potentially polarizing events such as protests or elections; and, to the same end, 
can expand the visual analysis to comparisons between profile images and other imagery pushed 
by the same accounts among their followings.  
It remains unclear whether the IRA campaign reflects broader shifts in the execution of 
influence operations. Some observers have argued that it may reflect a pragmatic approach by a 
private outfit to deliver a policy objective set by its patron, the Russian state (Miller, 2019). 
Nevertheless, state propaganda seems unlikely to altogether cease trafficking in the symbology 
of national identity and heroic or hegemonic masculinity (see for example Romanets, 2017). In 
other quarters, and while the IRA carried out their unorthodox campaign, Chinese influence 
operations promoted nationalism with a narrative that elevated fighting and dominance using 
militaristic tropes. The Chinese corps of hawkish ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomats mirror the patriotic 
blockbuster Rambo-style movie Wolf Warrior 2, where a former Chinese special-operations 
commando saves compatriots in a war-torn African country by defeating Western-led 
mercenaries. This campaign, waged at first on Chinese soil and later on Twitter (Zhong et al., 
2020), relied on the canonical propaganda symbology of national identity and military prowess 
to boost China’s influence and control of global narratives (Hille, 2020). 
Lastly, the methodological approach developed for this study maximizes the benefits of a 
mixed methods design combining the qualitative coding and analysis of photographic images 
with statistical and computer processing of the data. The triangulation of various approaches to 
visual inspection allowed us to reach saturation, and ultimately validity, which are considerable 
roadblocks in the transferability and generalizability of visual research (Bock et al., 2011). As 
such, we expect this approach to inform future research in the production of visuals that combine 
data analysis with the vantage point afforded by the visual research, including greater reflexivity, 
the high contextualization applied to the data, and hopefully greater insights into the potentials 
and limitations of the explored data. 
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Figure 1: From left to right, Twitter profile pictures of Trump supporters, Christians, Conservatives, Black Lives 
Matter activists, and self-identified Muscovites. 
Table 1: Coding categories applied to the Twitter profile image of Internet Research Agency accounts impersonating 
Black Lives Matter, Christians, Conservatives, Muscovites, and Trump supporters 
File  2625497896_profile.png 2625539381_profile.png 2671070290_profile.png 
Description White man swimming. 
He plays with a dolphin 
and smiles.  
Young white couple hugging 
outdoors. Man wears glasses. 
Woman smiles. Four other men 
in the background. 
Young white man 
smiling, wearing glasses, 
and a black cap 
Race W W W 
Composition Close-up Close-up Close-up 
Angle High angle Neutral Neutral 
Quality Professional Amateur Amateur 
In/outdoor (I/O) O O I 
People 1 2 1 
Gender 
(Male/Female/Group) 
M G M 
Sensual (True/False) F F F 
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Figure 2a: plot of 221 profile images combined for Christian, Conservatives, and Trump supporter groups, ordered 
by brightness (X axis) and color saturation (Y axis). Higher definition available at http://extrazoom.com/image-
106738.html?s=huln50x50. Figure 2b: plot of 201 profile images in the Muscovite group, ordered by brightness (X 




Figure 3a: 104 profile images of Conservatives, ordered by brightness (X axis) and color saturation (Y axis). Higher 
definition available at http://extrazoom.com/image-106731.html?s=huln50x50. Figure 3b: 75 profile images of 






Figure 4a: 57 profile images of Trump supporters, ordered by brightness (X axis) and color saturation (Y axis). 
Higher definition available at http://extrazoom.com/image-106733.html?s=huln50x50. Figure 4b: 61 profile images 
of Christians, ordered by brightness (X axis) and color saturation (Y axis). Higher definition available at 
http://extrazoom.com/image-106730.html?s=huln50x50. 
 
